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Abstract
Two-player zero-sum games of infinite duration and their quantitative versions are used in ver-
ification to model the interaction between a controller (Eve) and its environment (Adam). The
question usually addressed is that of the existence (and computability) of a strategy for Eve that can
maximize her payoff against any strategy of Adam. In this work, we are interested in strategies of
Eve that minimize her regret, i.e. strategies that minimize the difference between her actual payoff
and the payoff she could have achieved if she had known the strategy of Adam in advance. We
give algorithms to compute the strategies of Eve that ensure minimal regret against an adversary
whose choice of strategy is (i) unrestricted, (ii) limited to positional strategies, or (iii) limited to
word strategies, and show that the two last cases have natural modelling applications. These results
apply for quantitative games defined with the classical payoff functions Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, and
mean-payoff. We also show that our notion of regret minimization in which Adam is limited to word
strategies generalizes the notion of good for games introduced by Henzinger and Piterman, and is
related to the notion of determinization by pruning due to Aminof, Kupferman and Lampert.
1 Introduction
The model of two player games played on graphs is an adequate mathematical tool to solve important
problems in computer science, and in particular the reactive-system synthesis problem [PR89]. In that
context, the game models the non-terminating interaction between the system to synthesize and its
environment. Games with quantitative objectives are useful to formalize important quantitative aspects
such as mean-response time or energy consumption. They have attracted large attention recently, see
e.g. [CDHR10,BCD+11]. Most of the contributions in this context are for zero-sum games: the objective
of Eve (that models the system) is to maximize the value of the game while the objective of Adam
(that models the environment) is to minimize this value. This is a worst-case assumption: because the
cooperation of the environment cannot be assumed, we postulate that it is antagonistic.
In this antagonistic approach, the main solution concept is that of a winning strategy. Given a
threshold value, a winning strategy for Eve ensures a minimal value greater than the threshold against
any strategy of Adam. However, sometimes there are no winning strategies. What should the behaviour
of the system be in such cases? There are several possible answers to this question. One is to consider
non-zero sum extensions of those games: the environment (Adam) is not completely antagonistic, rather
it has its own specification. In such games, a strategy for Eve must be winning only when the outcome
satisfies the objectives of Adam, see e.g. [CDFR14]. Another option for Eve is to play a strategy which
minimizes her regret. The regret is informally defined as the difference between what a player actually
wins and what she could have won if she had known the strategy chosen by the other player. Minimization
of regret is a central concept in decision theory [Bel82]. This notion is important because it usually leads
to solutions that agree with common sense.
Let us illustrate the notion of regret minimization on the example of Fig. 1. In this example, Eve
owns the squares and Adam owns the circles (we do not use the letters labelling edges for the moment).
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Figure 1: Example weighted arena G0.
The game is played for infinitely many rounds and the value of a play for Eve is the long-run average
of the values of edges traversed during the play (the so-called mean-payoff). In this game, Eve is only
able to secure a mean-payoff of 12 when Adam is fully antagonistic. Indeed, if Eve (from v1) plays to v2
then Adam can force a mean-payoff value of 0, and if she plays to v3 then the mean-payoff value is at
least 12 . Note also that if Adam is not fully antagonistic, then the mean-payoff could be as high as 2.
Now, assume that Eve does not try to force the highest value in the worst-case but tries to minimize her
regret. If she plays v1 7→ v2 then the regret is equal to 1. This is because Adam can play the following
strategy: if Eve plays to v2 (from v1) then he plays v2 7→ v1 (giving a mean-payoff of 0), and if Eve plays
to v3 then he plays to v5 (giving a mean-payoff of 1). If she plays v1 7→ v3 then her regret is
3
2 since
Adam can play the symmetric strategy. It should thus be clear that the strategy of Eve which always
chooses v1 7→ v2 is indeed minimizing her regret.
In this paper, we will study three variants of regret minimization, each corresponding to a different
set of strategies we allow Adam to choose from. The first variant is when Adam can play any possible
strategy (as in the example above), the second variant is when Adam is restricted to playing memoryless
strategies, and the third variant is when Adam is restricted to playing word strategies. To illustrate
the last two variants, let us consider again the example of Fig. 1. Assume now that Adam is playing
memoryless strategies only. Then in this case, we claim that there is a strategy of Eve that ensures
regret 0. The strategy is as follows: first play to v2, if Adam chooses to go back to v1, then Eve should
henceforth play v1 7→ v3. We claim that this strategy has regret 0. Indeed, when v2 is visited, either
Adam chooses v2 7→ v4, and then Eve secures a mean-payoff of 2 (which is the maximal possible value),
or Adam chooses v2 7→ v1 and then we know that v1 7→ v2 is not a good option for Eve as cycling between
v1 and v2 yields a payoff of only 0. In this case, the mean-payoff is either 1, if Adam plays v3 7→ v5, or
1
2 ,
if he plays v3 7→ v1. In all the cases, the regret is 0. Let us now turn to the restriction to word strategies
for Adam. When considering this restriction, we use the letters that label the edges of the graph. A word
strategy for Adam is a function w : N → {a, b}. In this setting Adam plays a sequence of letters and
this sequence is independent of the current state of the game. It is more convenient to view the latter as
a game played on a weighted automata—assumed to be total and with at least one transition for every
action from every state—in which Adam plays letters and Eve responds by resolving non-determinism.
When Adam plays word strategies, the strategy that minimizes regret for Eve is to always play v1 7→ v2.
Indeed, for any word in which the letter a appears, the mean-payoff is equal to 2, and the regret is 0,
and for any word in which the letter a does not appear, the mean-payoff is 0 while it would have been
equal to 12 when playing v1 7→ v3. So the regret of this strategy is
1
2 and it is the minimal regret that
Eve can secure. Note that the three different strategies give three different values in our example. This
is in contrast with the worst-case analysis of the same problem (memoryless strategies suffice for both
players).
We claim that at least the two last variants are useful for modelling purposes. For example, the
memoryless restriction is useful when designing a system that needs to perform well in an environment
which is only partially known. In practical situations, a controller may discover the environment with
which it is interacting at run time. Such a situation can be modelled by an arena in which choices in
nodes of the environment model an entire family of environments and each memoryless strategy models
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Payoff type Any strategy Memoryless strategies Word strategies
Sup, Inf, PTIME-c PSPACE (Lem 4), EXPTIME-c
LimSup (Thm 1) coNP-h (Lem 11) (Thm 3)
LimInf PTIME-c (Thm 1) PSPACE-c (Thm 2) EXPTIME-c (Thm 3)
MP, MP MP equiv. (Thm 1) PSPACE-c (Thm 2) Undecidable (Lem 14)
Table 1: Complexity of deciding the regret threshold problem.
a specific environment of the family. In such cases, if we want to design a controller that performs
reasonably well against all the possible environments, we can consider a controller that minimizes regret:
the strategy of the controller will be as close as possible to an optimal strategy if we had known the
environment beforehand. This is, for example, the modelling choice done in the famous Canadian
traveller’s problem [PY91]: a driver is attempting to reach a specific location while ensuring the traversed
distance is not too far from the shortest feasible path. The partial knowledge is due to some roads being
closed because of snow. The Canadian traveller, when planning his itinerary, is in fact searching for
a strategy to minimize his regret for the shortest path measure against a memoryless adversary who
determines the roads that are closed. Similar situations naturally arise when synthesizing controllers
for robot motion planning [WET15]. We now illustrate the usefulness of the variant in which Adam is
restricted to play word strategies. Assume that we need to design a system embedded into an environment
that produces disturbances: if the sequence of disturbances produced by the environment is independent
of the behavior of the system, then it is natural to model this sequence not as a function of the state
of the system but as a temporal sequence of events, i.e. a word on the alphabet of the disturbances.
Clearly, if the sequences are not the result of an antagonistic process, then minimizing the regret against
all disturbance sequences is an adequate solution concept to obtain a reasonable system and may be
preferable to a system obtained from a strategy that is optimal under the antagonistic hypothesis.
Contributions. In this paper, we provide algorithms to solve the regret threshold problem (strict and
non-strict) in the three variants explained above, i.e. given a game and a threshold, does there exist a
strategy for Eve with a regret that is (strictly) less than the threshold against all (resp. all memoryless,
resp. all word) strategies for Adam. It is worth mentioning that, in the first two cases we consider,
we actually provide algorithms to solve the following search problem: find the controller which ensures
the minimal possible regret. Indeed, our algorithms are reductions to well-known games and are such
that a winning strategy for Eve in the resulting game corresponds to a regret-minimizing strategy in
the original one. Conversely, in games played against word strategies for Adam, we only explicitly solve
the regret threshold problem. However, since the set of possible regret values of the considered games is
finite and easy to describe, it will be obvious that one can implement a binary search to find the regret
value and a corresponding optimal regret-minimizing strategy for Eve.
We study this problem for six common quantitative measures: Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, MP, MP.
For all measures, but MP, the strict and non-strict threshold problems are equivalent. We state our
results for both cases for consistency. In almost all the cases, we provide matching lower bounds showing
the worst-case optimality of our algorithms. Our results are summarized in the table of Fig. 1. For the
variant in which Adam plays word strategies only, we show that we can recover decidability of mean-
payoff objectives when the memory of Eve is fixed in advance: in this case, the problem is NP-complete
(Theorems 4 and 5).
Related works. The notion of regret minimization is a central one in game theory, see e.g. [ZJBP08]
and references therein. Also, iterated regret minimization has been recently proposed by Halpern et al. as
a concept for non-zero sum games [HP12]. There, it is applied to matrix games and not to game graphs.
In a previous contribution, we have applied the iterated regret minimization concept to non-zero sum
games played on weighted graphs for the shortest path problem [FGR10]. Restrictions on how Adam is
allowed to play were not considered there. As we do not consider an explicit objective for Adam, we do
not consider iteration of the regret minimization here.
The disturbance-handling embedded system example was first given in [DF11]. In that work, the
authors introduce remorsefree strategies, which correspond to strategies which minimize regret in games
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with ω-regular objectives. They do not establish lower bounds on the complexity of realizability or
synthesis of remorsefree strategies and they focus on word strategies of Adam only.
In [HP06], Henzinger and Piterman introduce the notion of good for games automata. A non-
deterministic automaton is good for solving games if it fairly simulates the equivalent deterministic
automaton. We show that our notion of regret minimization for word strategies extends this notion to
the quantitative setting (Proposition 3). Our definitions give rise to a natural notion of approximate
determinization for weighted automata on infinite words.
In [AKL10], Aminof et al. introduce the notion of approximate determinization by pruning for
weighted sum automata over finite words. For α ∈ (0, 1], a weighted sum automaton is α-determinizable
by pruning if there exists a finite state strategy to resolve non-determinism and that constructs a run
whose value is at least α times the value of the maximal run of the given word. So, they consider a
notion of approximation which is a ratio. We will show that our concept of regret, when Adam plays
word strategies only, defines instead a notion of approximation with respect to the difference metric
for weighted automata (Proposition 2). There are other differences with their work. First, we consider
infinite words while they consider finite words. Second, we study a general notion of regret minimization
problem in which Eve can use any strategy while they restrict their study to fixed memory strategies
only and leave the problem open when the memory is not fixed a priori.
Finally, the main difference between these related works and this paper is that we study the Inf, Sup,
LimInf, LimSup, MP, MP measures while they consider the total sum measure or qualitative objectives.
2 Preliminaries
A weighted arena is a tuple G = (V, V∃, E, w, vI) where (V,E,w) is a finite edge-weighted graph
1 with
integer weights, V∃ ⊆ V , and vI ∈ V is the initial vertex. In the sequel we depict vertices owned by Eve
(i.e. V∃) with squares and vertices owned by Adam (i.e. V \ V∃) with circles. We denote the maximum
absolute value of a weight in a weighted arena by W .
A play in a weighted arena is an infinite sequence of vertices pi = v0v1 . . .where v0 = vI and (vi, vi+1) ∈
E for all i. We extend the weight function to partial plays by setting w(〈vi〉
l
i=k) =
∑l−1
i=k w(vi, vi+1).
A strategy for Eve (Adam) is a function σ that maps partial plays ending with a vertex v in V∃
(V \ V∃) to a successor of v. A strategy has memory m if it can be realized as the output of a finite
state machine with m states (see e.g. [HPR14] for a formal definition). A memoryless (or positional)
strategy is a strategy with memory 1, that is, a function that only depends on the last element of the
given partial play. A play pi = v0v1 . . . is consistent with a strategy σ for Eve (Adam) if whenever vi ∈ V∃
(vi ∈ V \ V∃), σ(〈vj〉j≤i) = vi+1. We denote by S∃(G) (S∀(G)) the set of all strategies for Eve (Adam)
and by Σm∃ (G) (Σ
m
∀ (G)) the set of all strategies for Eve (Adam) in G that require memory of size at
most m, in particular Σ1∃(G) (Σ
1
∀(G)) is the set of all memoryless strategies of Eve (Adam) in G. We
omit G if the context is clear.
Payoff functions. A play in a weighted arena defines an infinite sequence of weights. We define
below several classical payoff functions that map such sequences to real numbers.2 Formally, for a play
pi = v0v1 . . . we define:
• the Inf (Sup) payoff, is the minimum (maximum) weight seen along a play: Inf(pi) = inf{w(vi, vi+1)|i ≥
0} and Sup(pi) = sup{w(vi, vi+1) | i ≥ 0};
• the LimInf (LimSup) payoff, is the minimum (maximum) weight seen infinitely often: LimInf(pi) =
lim infi→∞ w(vi, vi+1) and, respectively, we have that LimSup(pi) = lim supi→∞ w(vi, vi+1);
• the mean-payoff value of a play, i.e. the limiting average weight, defined using lim inf or lim sup
since the running averages might not converge: MP(pi) = lim infk→∞
1
k
w(〈vi〉i<k) and MP(pi) =
lim supk→∞
1
k
w(〈vi〉i<k). In words, MP corresponds to the limit inferior of the average weight of
increasingly longer prefixes of the play while MP is defined as the limit superior of that same
sequence.
1W.l.o.g. G is assumed to be total: for each v ∈ V , there exists v′ ∈ V such that (v, v′) ∈ E.
2The values of all functions are not infinite, and therefore in R since we deal with finite graphs only.
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A payoff function Val is prefix-independent if for all plays pi = v0v1 . . ., for all i ≥ 0, Val(pi) =
Val(〈vj〉j≥i). It is well-known that LimInf, LimSup, MP, and MP are prefix-independent. Often, the
arguments that we develop work uniformly for these four measures because of their prefix-independent
property. Inf and Sup are not prefix-independent but often in the sequel we apply a simple transformation
to the game and encode Inf into a LimInf objective, and Sup into a LimSup objective. The transformation
consists of encoding in the vertices of the arena the minimal (maximal) weight that has been witnessed
by a play, and label the edges of the new graph with this same recorded weight. When this simple
transformation does not suffice, we mention it explicitly.
Regret. Consider a fixed weighted arena G, and payoff function Val. Given strategies σ, τ , for Eve
and Adam respectively, and v ∈ V , we denote by pivστ the unique play starting from v that is consistent
with σ and τ and denote its value by: ValvG(σ, τ) := Val(pi
v
στ ). We omit G if it is clear from the context.
If v is omitted, it is assumed to be vI .
Let Σ∃ ⊆ S∃ and Σ∀ ⊆ S∀ be sets of strategies for Eve and Adam respectively. Given σ ∈ Σ∃ we
define the regret of σ in G w.r.t. Σ∃ and Σ∀ as:
regσΣ∃,Σ∀(G) := supτ∈Σ∀(supσ′∈Σ∃ Val(σ
′, τ)−Val(σ, τ)).
We define the regret of G w.r.t. Σ∃ and Σ∀ as:
RegΣ∃,Σ∀(G) := infσ∈Σ∃ reg
σ
Σ∃,Σ∀
(G).
When Σ∃ or Σ∀ are omitted from reg(·) and Reg(·) they are assumed to be the set of all strategies for
Eve and Adam.
Remark 1 (Ratio vs. difference). Let G be a weighted arena and Σ∃ ⊆ S∃ and Σ∀ ⊆ S∀. Consider
the regret of G defined using the ratio measure, instead of difference. For Inf, Sup, LimInf, and LimSup,
deciding if the regret of G is (strictly) less than a given threshold r reduces (in polynomial time) to
deciding the same problem in Glog – which is obtained by replacing every weight x in G with log2 x – for
threshold log2 r with the difference measure.
We will make use of two other values associated with the vertices of an arena: the antagonistic and
cooperative values, defined for plays from a vertex v ∈ V as
aValv(G) := sup
σ∈S∃
inf
τ∈S∀
Valv(σ, τ) cValv(G) := sup
σ∈S∃
sup
τ∈S∀
Valv(σ, τ).
When clear from context G will be omitted, and if v is omitted it is assumed to be vI .
Remark 2. It is well-known that cVal and aVal can be computed in polynomial time, w.r.t. the
underlying graph of the given arena, for all payoff functions but MP [CdAHS03,CDH10]. For MP, cVal
is known to be computable in polynomial time, for aVal it can be done in UP ∩ coUP [Jur98] and in
pseudo-polynomial time [ZP96,BCD+11].
3 Variant I: Adam plays any strategy
For this variant, we establish that for all the payoff functions that we consider, the problem of computing
the antagonistic value and the problem of computing the regret value are inter-reducible in polynomial
time. As a direct consequence, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Deciding if the regret value is less than a given threshold (strictly or non-strictly) is PTIME-
complete (under log-space reductions) for Inf, Sup, LimInf, and LimSup, and equivalent to mean-payoff
games (under polynomial-time reductions) for MP and MP.
Upper bounds. We now describe an algorithm to compute regret for all payoff functions. To do so,
we will use the fact that all payoff functions we consider, can be assumed to be prefix-independent. Thus,
let us first convince the reader that one can, in polynomial time, modify Inf and Sup games so that they
become prefix-independent.
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Figure 2: Weighted arena Gˆ, constructed from G. Dotted lines represent several edges added when the
condition labelling it is met.
Lemma 1. For a given weighted arena G, and payoff function Sup: Reg(G) = Reg(Gmax); for payoff
function Inf: Reg(G) = Reg(Gmin).
Consider a weighted arena G = (V, V∃, vI , E, w). We describe how to construct Gmin from G so that
there is a clear bijection between plays in both games defined with the Inf payoff function. The arena
Gmin consists of the following components:
• V ′ = V × {w(e) | e ∈ E};
• V ′∃ = {(v, n) ∈ V
′ | v ∈ V∃};
• v′I = (vI ,W );
• E′ ∋
(
(u, n), (v,m)
)
if and only if (u, v) ∈ E and m = min{n,w(u, v)};
• w′
(
(u, n), (v,m)
)
= m.
Intuitively, the construction keeps track of the minimal weight witnessed by a play by encoding it into
the vertices themselves. It is not hard to see that plays in Gmin indeed have a one-to-one correspondence
with plays in G. Furthermore, the LimInf and LimSup values of a play in Gmin are easily seen to be
equivalent to the Inf value of the play in Gmin and the corresponding play in G.
A similar idea can be used to construct weighted arena Gmax from a Sup game such that the maximal
weight is recorded (instead of the minimal).
Lemma 2. For payoff functions Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, MP, and MP computing the regret of a game
is at most as hard as computing the antagonistic value of a (polynomial-size) game with the same payoff
function.
We now describe the construction used to prove Lemma 2.
Let us fix a weighted arena G. We define a new weight function w′ as follows. For any edge e = (u, v)
let w′(e) = −∞ if u ∈ V \ V∃, and if u ∈ V∃ then w
′(e) = max{cValv
′
| (u, v′) ∈ E \ {e}}. Intuitively,
w′ represents the best value obtainable for a strategy of Eve that differs at the given edge. It is not
difficult to see that in order to minimize regret, Eve is trying to minimize the difference between the
value given by the original weight function w and the value given by w′. Let Range(w′) be the set of
values {w′(e) | e ∈ E}. For b ∈ Range(w′) we define Gb to be the graph obtained by restricting G—the
original weighted arena with weight function w—to edges e with w′(e) ≤ b.
Next, we will construct a new weighted arena Gˆ such that the regret of G is a function of the
antagonistic value of Gˆ. Figure 2 depicts the general form of the arena we construct. We have three
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vertices v0 ∈ Vˆ \ Vˆ∃ and v1, v⊥ ∈ Vˆ∃ and a “copy” of G as G
b for each b ∈ Range(w′) \ {−∞}. We have
a self-loop of weight 0 on v0 which is the initial vertex of Gˆ, a self-loop of weight −2W − 1 on v⊥, and
weight-0 edges from v0 to v1 and from v1 to the initial vertices of G
b for all b. Recall that Gb might not
be total. To fix this we add, for all vertices without a successor, a weight-0 edge to v⊥. The remainder
of the weight function wˆ, is defined for each edge eb in Gb as wˆ(eb) = w(e)− b.
Intuitively, in Gˆ Adam first decides whether he can ensure a non-zero regret. If this is the case, then
he moves to v1. Next, Eve chooses a maximal value she will allow for strategies which differ from the
one she will play (this is the choice of b). The play then moves to the corresponding copy of G, i.e. Gb.
She can now play to maximize her mean-payoff value. However, if her choice of b was not correct then
the play will end in v⊥.
We show that, for all prefix-independent payoff functions we consider, the following holds:
Claim 1. For all prefix-independent payoff functions considered in this work Reg(G) = −aVal(Gˆ).
This implies Lemma 2 for all prefix-independent payoff functions. Together with Lemma 1, we get
the same result for Inf and Sup.
of the Claim. Let us start by arguing that the following equality holds.
Reg(G) = inf
σ∈S∃
sup
τ∈S∀
sup
σ′∈S∃\{σ}
{0,Val(σ′, τ)−Val(σ, τ)}. (1)
Indeed, it follows from the definition of regret that if σ′ = σ then the regret of the game is 0. Thus, Adam
can always ensure the regret of a game is at least 0. Now, for b ∈ Range(w′), define Σ∃(b) ⊆ S∃(G) as:
Σ∃(b) := {σ | sup
τ∈S∀
sup
σ′∈S∃\{σ}
Val(σ′, τ) ≤ b}.
It is clear from the definitions that σ ∈ Σ∃(b) if and only if σ is a strategy for Eve in G
b which avoids
ever reaching v⊥. Now, if we let
bσ = sup
τ∈S∀
sup
σ′∈S∃\{σ}
Val(σ′, τ),
then σ ∈ Σ∃(b) if and only bσ ≤ b. It follows that for all σ:
sup
τ∈S∀
sup
σ′∈S∃\{σ}
Val(σ′, τ) = inf{b | σ ∈ Σ∃(b)}. (2)
We now turn to the mean-payoff game played on Gˆ, and make some observations about the strategies
we need to consider. It is well known that memoryless strategies suffice for either player to ensure
an antagonistic value of at least (resp. at most) aVal(Gˆ), for all quantitative games considered in
this work, so we can assume that Adam and Eve play positionally. It follows that all plays either
remain in v0, or move to G
b for some b, and Adam can ensure a non-positive payoff. Note that for
bmax = max(Range(w
′) \ {−∞}) we have Gbmax = G. So the copy of Gbmax in Gˆ has no edge to v⊥,
and by playing to this sub-graph Eve can ensure a payoff of at least −|bmax −W | ≥ −2W . As any play
that reaches v⊥ will have a payoff of −2W − 1, we can restrict Eve to strategies which avoid v⊥, and
hence all plays either remain in v0 or (eventually) in the copy of G
b for some b. Now Gb contains no
restrictions for Adam, so we can assume that he plays the same strategy in all the copies of Gb (where
he cannot force the play to v⊥), and these strategies have a one-to-one correspondence with strategies in
G. Likewise, as Eve chooses a unique Gb to play in, we have a one-to-one correspondence with strategies
of Eve in Gˆ and strategies in G. More precisely, if σˆ ∈ S∃(Gˆ) is such that σˆ(v1) = v
b
I and σˆ avoids v⊥,
then the corresponding strategy σ ∈ S∃(G) is a valid strategy in G
b, and hence:
σˆ(v1) = v
b
I =⇒ σ ∈ Σ(b). (3)
Now suppose σˆ ∈ S∃(Gˆ) is a strategy such that σˆ(v1) = v
b
I and σˆ avoids v⊥, and τˆ ∈ S∀(Gˆ) is a strategy
such that τˆ (v0) = v1. Let σ ∈ Σ(b) and τ ∈ S∀(G) be the strategies in G corresponding to σˆ and τˆ
respectively. It is easy to show that:
−Val
Gˆ
(σˆ, τˆ ) = b−ValG(σ, τ). (4)
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Figure 3: Gadget to reduce a game to its regret game.
Putting together Equations (1)–(4) gives:
−aVal(Gˆ) = − supσˆ inf τˆ ValGˆ(σˆ, τˆ)
= inf σˆ sup({−ValGˆ(σˆ, τˆ ) | τˆ (v0) = v1} ∪ {0})
= inf{sup({−Val
Gˆ
(σˆ, τˆ ) | τˆ (v0) = v1} ∪ {0}) | σˆ(v1) = v
b
I}
= inf{supτ∈S∀({b−ValG(σ, τ)} ∪ {0}) | σ ∈ Σ(b)}
= infσ∈S∃ supτ∈S∀({inf{b | σ ∈ Σ(b)} −ValG(σ, τ)} ∪ {0})
= infσ∈S∃ supτ∈S∀ supσ′∈S∃{0,ValG(σ
′, τ)−ValG(σ, τ)}
= Reg(G) as required.
Lower bounds. For all the payoff functions, from G we can construct in logarithmic space G′ such
that the antagonistic value of G is a function of the regret value of G′, and so we have:
Lemma 3. For payoff functions Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, MP, and MP computing the regret of a game
is at least as hard as computing the antagonistic value of a (polynomial-size) game with the same payoff
function.
Proof. Suppose G is a weighted arena with initial vertex vI . Consider the weighted arena G
′ obtained
by adding to G the gadget of Figure 3. The initial vertex of G′ is set to be v′I . In G
′ from v′I Eve can
either progress to the original game or to the new gadget, both with weight L. We claim that the right
choice of values for the parameters L,M1,M2, N1, N2 makes it so that the antagonistic value of G is a
function of the regret of the game G′.
Let us first give the values of L, M1, M2, N1, and N2 for each of the payoff functions considered.
For all our payoff functions we have M1 = M2 = L; N1 = W + 1; and N2 = −3W − 2. For Inf we have
L =W , for Sup we have L = −W and for the remaining payoff functions we have L = 0.
The following result shows that computing the regret of G is at least as hard as computing the
(antagonistic) value of G′.
Claim 2. For all payoff functions:
aVal(G) =W + 1−Reg(G′).
We first observe that for all payoff functions we consider we have that aVal(G) and cVal(G) both
lie in [−W,W ]. At v′I Eve has a choice: she can choose to remain in the gadget or she can move to the
original game G. If she chooses to remain in the gadget, her payoff will be −3W − 2, meanwhile Adam
could choose a strategy that would have achieved a payoff of cVal(G) if she had chosen to play to G.
Hence her regret in this case is cVal(G) + 3W +2 ≥ 2W +2. Otherwise, if she chooses to play to G she
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Figure 4: Example weighted arena G1.
can achieve a payoff of at most aVal(G). As cVal(G) ≤ W is the maximum possible payoff achievable
in G, the strategy which now maximizes Eve’s regret is the one which remains in the gadget – giving
a payoff of W + 1. Her regret in this case is W + 1 − aVal(G) ≤ 2W + 1. Therefore, to minimize her
regret she will play this strategy, and Reg(G′) =W + 1− aVal(G).
Memory requirements for Eve and Adam. It follows from the reductions underlying the proof of
Lemma 2 that Eve only requires positional strategies to minimize regret when there is no restriction on
Adam’s strategies. On the other hand, for any given strategy σ for Eve, the strategy τ for Adam which
witnesses the maximal regret against it consists of a combination of three positional strategies: first he
moves to the optimal vertex for deviating (it is from this vertex that the alternative strategy σ′ of Eve
will achieve a better payoff against τ), then he plays his optimal (positional) strategy in the antagonistic
game (i.e. against σ). His strategy for the alternative scenario, i.e. against σ′, is his optimal strategy in
the co-operative game which is also positional. This combined strategy is clearly realizable as a strategy
with three memory states, giving us:
Corollary 1. For payoff functions LimInf, LimSup, MP and MP: Reg(G) = RegΣ1
∃
,Σ3
∀
(G).
The algorithm we give relies on the prefix-independence of the payoff function. As the transformation
from Inf and Sup to equivalent prefix-independent ones is polynomial it follows that polynomial memory
(w.r.t. the size of the underlying graph of the arena) suffices for both players.
4 Variant II: Adam plays memoryless strategies
For this variant, we provide a polynomial space algorithm to solve the problem for all the payoff functions,
we then provide lower bounds.
Theorem 2. Deciding if the regret value is less than a given threshold (strictly or non-strictly) playing
against memoryless strategies of Adam is PSPACE-complete for LimInf, MP and MP; in PSPACE and
coNP-hard for Inf, Sup and LimSup.
Upper bounds. Let us now show how to compute regret against positional adversaries.
Lemma 4. For payoff functions Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, MP and MP, the regret of a game played
against a positional adversary can be computed in polynomial space.
Given a weighted arena G, we construct a new weighted arena Gˆ such that we have that −aVal(Gˆ)
is equivalent to the regret of G.
The vertices of Gˆ encode the choices made by Adam. For a subset of edges D ⊆ E, let G↾D
denote the weighted arena (V, V∃, D,w, vI). The new weighted arena Gˆ is the tuple (Vˆ , Vˆ∃, Eˆ, wˆ, vˆI)
where (i) Vˆ = V × P(E); (ii) Vˆ∃ = {(v,D) ∈ Vˆ | v ∈ V∃}; (iii) vˆI = (vI , E); (iv) Eˆ contains the
edge
(
(u,C), (v,D)
)
if and only if (u, v) ∈ C and, either u ∈ V∃ and D = C, or u ∈ V \ V∃ and
D = C \ {(u, x) ∈ E | x 6= v}; (v) wˆ
(
(u,C), (v,D)
)
= w(u, v) − cVal(G↾D). The application of this
transformation for the graph of Fig. 4 w.r.t. to the MP payoff function is given in Fig. 5.
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Figure 5: Weighted arena Gˆ1, constructed from G1 w.r.t the MP payoff function. In the edge set
component only edges leaving Adam nodes are depicted.
Consider a play pˆi = (v0, C0)(v1, C1) . . . in Gˆ. We denote by [pˆi]k, for k ∈ {1, 2}, the sequence 〈ck,i〉i≥0,
where ck,i is the k-th component of the i-th pair from pˆi. Observe that [pˆi]1 is a valid play in G. Also
observe that E ⊇ Cj ⊇ Cj+1 for all j. Hence [pˆi]2 is an infinite descending chain of finite subsets,
and therefore lim [pˆi]
2
is well-defined. Finally, we define c(pˆi) := cVal(G↾ lim [pˆi]
2
). The following result
relates the value of a play in Gˆ to the value of the corresponding play in G.
Lemma 5. For payoff functions LimInf, LimSup,MP,MP and for any play pˆi in Gˆ we have that Val(pˆi) =
Val([pˆi]
1
)− c(pˆi).
Proof. We first establish the following intermediate result. It follows from the existence of lim [pˆi]
2
and
the definition of c(·) that:
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
cVal(G↾Ci) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
cVal(G↾Ci) = c(pˆi). (5)
We now show that the result holds for MP.
Val(pˆi) = lim inf
n→∞
(
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
(w(vi, vi+1)− cVal(G↾Cj))
)
defs. of Val(·), wˆ
= Val([pˆi]
1
)− lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
cVal(G↾Cj) def. of Val(·)
= Val([pˆi]
1
)− c(pˆi) from Eq. (5)
The proofs for the other payoff functions are almost identical (for LimInf and LimSup replace the use
of Equation (5) by Equation (6)).
lim sup
i→∞
cVal(G↾Ci) = lim inf
i→∞
cVal(G↾Ci) = c(pˆi). (6)
We now describe how to translate winning strategies for either player from Gˆ back to G, i.e. given an
optimal maximizing (minimizing) strategy for Eve (Adam) in Gˆ we construct the corresponding optimal
regret minimizing strategy (memoryless regret maximizing counter-strategy) for Eve (Adam) in G. For
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clarity, we follow this same naming convention throughout this section: again, we say a strategy is an
optimal maximizing (minimizing) strategy when we speak about antagonistic and cooperative games, we
say a strategy is an optimal regret maximizing (regret minimizing) when we speak about regret games.
When this does not suffice, we explicitly state which kind of game we are speaking about.
Let εˆ ∈ S∃(Gˆ) be an optimal maximizing strategy of Eve in Gˆ and αˆ ∈ S∀(Gˆ) be an optimal
minimizing strategy of Adam. Indeed, in [EM79] it was shown that mean-payoff games are positionally
determined. We will now define a strategy for Eve in G which for every play prefix s constructs a valid
play prefix sˆ in Gˆ and plays as εˆ would in Gˆ for sˆ. More formally, for a play prefix s from G, denote
by [s]
−1
1
the corresponding sequence of vertex and edge-set pairs in Gˆ (indeed, it is the inverse function
of [·]
1
, which is easily seen to be bijective). Define σ ∈ S∃(G) as follows: σ(s) = [εˆ([s]
−1
1
)]
1
for all play
prefixes s ∈ V ∗ · V∃ in G consistent with a positional strategy of Adam.
For a fixed strategy of Eve we can translate the optimal minimizing strategy of Adam in Gˆ into an
optimal memoryless regret maximizing counter-strategy of his in G. Formally, for an arbitrary strategy
σ for Eve in G, define σˆ ∈ S∃(Gˆ) as follows: σˆ(sˆ) = σ([sˆ]1) for all sˆ ∈ Vˆ
∗ · Vˆ∃. Let τσ be an optimal
(positional) maximizing strategy for Adam in G↾ lim [piσˆαˆ]2.
It is not hard to see the described strategy of Eve ensures a regret value of at most −aVal(Gˆ).
Slightly less obvious is the fact that for any strategy of Eve, the counter-strategy τσ of Adam is such
that supσ′∈S∃ ValG(σ
′, τσ)−ValG(σ, τσ) ≥ −aVal(Gˆ).
Lemma 6. For payoff functions LimInf, LimSup, MP, and MP:
RegS∃,Σ1∀
(G) = −aVal(Gˆ).
Proof. The proof is decomposed into two parts. First, we describe a strategy σ ∈ S∃(G) which ensures
a regret value of at most −aVal(Gˆ). Second, we show that for any σ ∈ S∃(G) there is a τ ∈ Σ
1
∀(G) such
that
sup
σ′∈S∃
ValG(σ
′, τ)−ValG(σ, τ) ≥ −aVal(Gˆ).
The result follows.
We have already mentioned earlier that for a play pˆi in Gˆ we have that [pˆi]
1
is a play in G. Let
PPref(G) denote the set of all play prefixes consistent with a positional strategy for Adam in G. It is not
difficult to see that [·]
1
is indeed a bijection between plays of Gˆ and plays of G consistent with positional
strategies for Adam.
It follows from the determinacy of antagonistic games defined by the payoff functions considered in
this work that there are optimal strategies for Eve and Adam that ensure a payoff of, respectively, at
least and at most a value aVal(Gˆ) against any strategy of the opposing player. Let εˆ ∈ S∃(Gˆ) be an
optimal maximizing strategy of Eve in Gˆ and αˆ ∈ S∀(Gˆ) be an optimal minimizing strategy of Adam.
(First Part). Define a strategy σ from S∃(G) as follows: σ(s) = [εˆ([s]
−1
1
)]
1
for all s ∈ PPref(G) · V∃.
We claim that
regσ
S∃,Σ1∀
(G) ≤ −aVal(Gˆ).
Towards a contradiction, assume there are τ ∈ Σ1∀(G) and σ
′ ∈ S∃(G) such that
ValG(σ
′, τ)−ValG(σ, τ) > −aVal(Gˆ).
Define a strategy τˆ ∈ S∀(Gˆ) as follows: τˆ (sˆ) = τ([sˆ]1) for all sˆ ∈ Vˆ
∗ · ˆV \ V∃. From the definition of εˆ
and our assumption we get that
ValG(σ
′, τ)−ValG(σ, τ) > −aVal(Gˆ) ≥ −ValGˆ(εˆ, τˆ ). (7)
It is straightforward to verify that [piστ ]
−1
1
= piεˆτˆ . Therefore, from Lemma 5, we have:
Val(piσ′τ ) > Val(piστ )−Val(piεˆτˆ ) = cVal(G↾ lim [piεˆτˆ ]2). (8)
At this point we note that, since τ is a positional strategy, it holds that ValG(σ
′, τ) is at most the
highest payoff value attainable in G restricted to the edges allowed by τ . Formally, if Eτ = {(u, v) ∈
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E | u ∈ V \ V∃ =⇒ v = τ(u)} then Val(piσ′τ ) ≤ cVal(G↾Eτ ). Also, by construction of τˆ we get that
Eτ ⊆ lim [piεˆτˆ ]2. It should be clear that this implies cVal(G↾ lim [piεˆτˆ ]2) ≥ cVal(G↾Eτ ). This contradicts
Equation (8).
(Second Part). For the second part of the proof we require the following result which relates positional
strategies for Adam in G that agree on certain vertices to strategies in sub-graphs defined by plays in Gˆ.
Claim 3. Let σ ∈ S∃(G) and τ, τ
′ ∈ Σ1∀(G). Then piστ = piστ ′ if and only if τ
′ ∈ Σ1∀(G↾ lim [[piτσ]
−1
1
]
2
)
Proof. (only if) Note that by construction of Gˆ we have that once Adam chooses an edge
(
(u,C), (v,D)
)
from a vertex (v, C) ∈ Vˆ \ Vˆ∃ then on any subsequent visit to a vertex (u,C
′) ∈ Vˆ \ Vˆ∃ he has no other
option but to go to (v, C′). That is, his choice is restricted to be consistent with the history of the
play. For a play pˆi in Gˆ, it is clear that the sequence [pˆi]
2
is the decreasing sequence of sets of edges
consistent (for Adam) with the history of the play in the same manner. In particular, for any τ ′ ∈ Σ1∀(G)
and any play pi in G consistent with τ ′ we have that τ ′ is a valid strategy for Adam in G↾E′ where
E′ = lim [[pi]
−1
1
]
2
. As piστ = piστ ′ is a play consistent with τ
′, the result follows.
(if) Suppose piστ 6= piστ ′ , and let v be the last vertex in their common prefix. As σ is common
to both plays, we have v ∈ V \ V∃, and τ(v) 6= τ
′(v). In particular, (v, τ ′(v)) /∈ lim [[piτσ ]
−1
1
]
2
so
τ ′ /∈ Σ1∀(G↾ lim [[piτσ]
−1
1
]
2
).
For an arbitrary strategy σ for Eve inG, define σˆ ∈ S∃(Gˆ) as follows: σˆ(sˆ·(v,D)) = (σ([sˆ · (v,D)]
−1
1
), D)
for all sˆ·(v,D) ∈ Vˆ ∗·Vˆ∃. Let τσ be an optimal (positional) maximizing strategy for Adam inG↾ lim [piσˆαˆ]2.
We claim that for all σ ∈ S∃(G) we have that
sup
σ′∈S∃
ValG(σ
′, τσ)−ValG(σ, τσ) ≥ −aVal(Gˆ).
Towards a contradiction, assume that for some σ ∈ S∃(G) it is the case that for all σ
′ ∈ S∃(G) the left
hand side of the above inequality is strictly smaller than the right hand side. By definition of αˆ we then
get the following inequality.
sup
σ′∈S∃
ValG(σ
′, τσ)−ValG(σ, τσ) < −aVal(Gˆ) ≤ −ValGˆ(σˆ, αˆ) (9)
Using the above Claim it is easy to show that [piστσ ]1 = piσˆαˆ. Hence, by Equation (9) and Lemma 5 we
get that:
sup
σ′∈S∃
Val(piσ′τσ ) < cVal(G↾ lim [piσˆαˆ]2) (10)
However, by choice of τσ, we know that there is a strategy σ
′′ ∈ S∃(G) such that Val(piσ′′τσ) =
cVal(G↾ lim [piσˆαˆ]2). This contradicts Equation (10) and completes the proof of the Theorem.
If G was constructed from a Inf or Sup game H , then one could easily transfer the described strategy
of Eve, σ into a strategy for her in H which achieves the same regret. In order to have a symmetric
result we still lack the ability to transfer a strategy of Adam from Gˆ to the original game H . Consider
a modified construction in which we additionally keep track of the minimal (resp. maximal) weight seen
so far by a play, just like described in Sect. 3. Denote the corresponding game by G˜. The vertex set
V˜ of G˜ is thus a set of triples of the form (v, C, x) where x is the minimal (resp. maximal) weight the
play has witnessed. We observe that in the proof of the above result the intuition behind why we can
transfer a strategy of Adam from Gˆ back to G as a memoryless strategy, although the vertices in Gˆ
already encode additional information, is that once we have fixed a strategy of Eve in G, this gives
us enough information about the prefix of the play before visiting any Adam vertex. In other words, we
construct a strategy of Adam tailored to spoil a specific strategy of Eve, σ, in G using the information
we gather from [·]−1
1
and his optimal strategy in Gˆ. These properties still hold in G˜. Thus, we get the
following result.
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Lemma 7. For payoff functions Inf, Sup: RegS∃,Σ1∀
(G) = −aVal(G˜).
We recall a result from [EM79] which gives us an algorithm for computing the value Reg
S∃,Σ1∀
(G) in
polynomial space. In [EM79] the authors show that the value of a mean-payoff game G is equivalent to
the value of a finite cycle forming game ΓG played on G. The game is identical to the mean-payoff game
except that it is finite. The game is stopped as soon as a cycle is formed and the value of the game is
given by the mean-payoff value of the cycle.
Proposition 1 (Finite Mean-Payoff Game [EM79]). The value of a mean-payoff game G is equal to the
value of the finite cycle forming game ΓG played on the same weighted arena.
As LimInf and LimSup games are also equivalent to their finite cycle forming game (see [AR14]) it
follows that one can use an Alternating Turing Machine to compute the value of a game and that said
machine will stop in time bounded by the length of the largest simple cycle in the arena. We note the
length of the longest simple path in Gˆ is bounded by |V |(|E| + 1). Hence, we can compute the winner
of Gˆ in alternating polynomial time. Since APTIME = PSPACE, this concludes the proof of Lemma 4.
Lower bounds. We give a reduction from the QSAT Problem to the problem of determining whether,
given r ∈ Q, RegS∃,Σ1∀
(G)⊳ r for the payoff functions LimInf, MP, and MP (for ⊳ ∈ {<,≤}). Then we
provide a reduction from the complement of the 2-disjoint-paths Problem for LimSup, Sup, and Inf.
The crux of the reduction from QSAT is a gadget for each clause of the QSAT formula. Visiting this
gadget allows Eve to gain information about the highest payoff obtainable in the gadget, each entry point
corresponds to a literal from the clause, and the literal is visited when it is made true by the valuation
of variables chosen by Eve and Adam in the reduction described below. Figure 7 depicts an instance of
the gadget for a particular clause. Let us focus on the mean-payoff function. Note that staying in the
inner 6-vertex triangle would yield a mean-payoff value of 4. However, in order to do so, Adam needs
to cooperate with Eve at all three corner vertices. Also note that if he does cooperate in at least one of
these vertices then Eve can secure a payoff value of at least 113 .
Lemma 8. For r ∈ Q, weighted arena G and payoff function LimInf, MP, or MP, determining whether
Reg
S∃,Σ1∀
(G)⊳ r, for ⊳ ∈ {<,≤}, is PSPACE-hard.
The QSAT Problem asks whether a given fully quantified boolean formula (QBF) is satisfiable.
The problem is known to be PSPACE-complete [GJ79]. It is known the result holds even if the formula
is assumed to be in conjunctive normal form with three literals per clause (also known as 3-CNF).
Therefore, w.l.o.g., we consider an instance of the QSAT Problem to be given in the following form:
∃x0∀x1∃x2 . . .Φ(x0, x1, . . . , xn)
where Φ is in 3-CNF. Also w.l.o.g., we assume that every non-trivially true clause has at least one
existentially quantified variable (as otherwise the answer to the problem is trivial).
It is common to consider a QBF as a game between an existential and a universal player. The
existential player chooses a truth value for existentially quantified variable xi and the universal player
responds with a truth value for xi+1. After n turns the truth value of Φ determines the winner: the
existential player wins if Φ is true and the universal player wins otherwise. The game we shall construct
mimics the choices of the existential and universal player and makes sure that the regret of the game is
small if and only if Φ is true.
Let us first consider the strict regret threshold problem. We will construct a weighted arena G in
which Eve wins in the strict regret threshold problem for threshold 2 if and only if Φ is true.
Lemma 9. For weighted arena G and payoff function LimInf, MP, or MP, determining whether RegS∃,Σ1∀
(G) <
2 is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. We first describe the value-choosing part of the game (see Figure 6). V∃ contains vertices for
every existentially quantified variable from the QBF and V \ V∃ contains vertices for every universally
quantified variable. At each of this vertices, there are two outgoing edges with weight 0 corresponding to
a choice of truth value for the variable. For the variable xi vertex, the true edge leads to a vertex from
13
x0
x0
x1
x1
· · ·
xn
xn
Φ
Ci
· · ·
Cj
2
Figure 6: Depiction of the reduction from QBF.
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Figure 7: Clause gadget for the QBF reduction for clause xi ∨ ¬xj ∨ xk.
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which Eve can choose to move to any of the clause gadgets corresponding to clauses where the literal
xi occurs (see dotted incoming edge in Figure 7) or to advance to xi+1. The false edge construction is
similar, while leading to the literal xi rather than to xi. From the vertices encoding the choice of truth
value for xn Eve can either visit the clause gadgets for it or move to a “final” vertex Φ ∈ V∃. This final
vertex has a self-loop with weight 2.
To conclude the proof, we describe the strategy of Eve which ensures the desired property if the QBF
is satisfiable and a strategy of Adam which ensures the property is falsified otherwise.
Assume the QBF is true. It follows that there is a strategy of the existential player in the QBF game
such that for any strategy of the universal player the QBF will be true after they both choose values for
the variables. Eve now follows this strategy while visiting all clause gadgets corresponding to occurrences
of chosen literals. At every gadget clause she visits she chooses to enter the gadget. If Adam now decides
to take the weight 4 edge, Eve can achieve a mean-payoff value of 113 or a LimInf value of 3 by staying
in the gadget. In this case the claim trivially holds. We therefore focus in the case where Adam chooses
to take Eve back to the vertex from which she entered the gadget. She can now go to the next clause
gadget and repeat. Thus, when the play reaches vertex Φ, Eve must have visited every clause gadget
and Adam has chosen to disallow a weight 4 edge in every gadget. Now Eve can ensure a payoff value of
2 by going to Φ. As she has witnessed that in every clause gadget there is at least one vertex in which
Adam is not helping her, alternative strategies might have ensured a mean-payoff of at most 113 and a
LimInf value of at most 3. Thus, her regret is less than 2.
Conversely, if the universal player had a winning strategy (or, in other words, the QBF was not
satisfiable) then the strategy of Adam consists in following this strategy in choosing values for the
variables and taking Eve out of clause gadgets if she ever enters one. If the play arrives at Φ we have
that there is at least one clause gadget that was not visited by the play. We note there is an alternative
strategy of Eve which, by choosing a different valuation of some variable, reaches this clause gadget and
with the help of Adam achieves value 4. Hence, this strategy of Adam ensures regret of exactly 2. If
Eve avoids reaching Φ then she can ensure a value of at most 0, which means an even greater regret for
her.
We observe that the above reduction can be readily parameterized. That is, we can replace the 4
value, the 3 value and the 2 value by arbitrary values A, B, C satisfying the following constraints:
• A > B > C,
• 2A+B3 − C < r so that Eve wins if Φ is true,
• A− C ≥ r so that Adam wins if Φ is false, and
• A− 2A+B3 < r so that he never helps Eve in the clause gadgets.
Indeed, the valuation of A, B, C we chose: 4, 3, 2 with r = 2, satisfies these inequalities exactly. It is
not hard to see that if we find a valuation for r, A, B, C which meets the first restriction and the last
three having changed from strict to non-strict, and vice-versa, we can get a reduction that works for the
non-strict regret threshold problem. That is, find values such that
• A > B > C,
• 2A+B3 − C ≤ r so that Eve wins if Φ is true,
• A− C > r so that Adam wins if Φ is false, and
• A− 2A+B3 ≤ r so that he never helps Eve in the clause gadgets.
For example, one could consider A = 10, B = 7, C = 5 and r = 4.
Lemma 10. For weighted arena G and payoff function LimInf, MP, or MP, determining whether
RegS∃,Σ1∀
(G) ≤ 4 is PSPACE-hard.
Lemma 11. For r ∈ Q, weighted arena G and payoff function Inf, Sup, or LimSup, determining whether
RegS∃,Σ1∀
(G)⊳ r, for ⊳ ∈ {<,≤}, is coNP-hard.
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Figure 8: Regret gadget for 2-disjoint-paths reduction.
Proof. We provide a reduction from the complement of the 2-disjoint-paths Problem on directed
graphs [ET98]. As the problem is known to be NP-complete, the result follows. In other words, we
sketch how to translate a given instance of the 2-disjoint-paths Problem into a weighted arena in
which Eve can ensure regret value strictly less than 1 if and only if the answer to the 2-disjoint-paths
Problem is negative.
Consider a directed graph G and distinct vertex pairs (s1, t1) and (s2, t2). W.l.o.g. we assume that
for all i ∈ {1, 2}: (i) ti is reachable from si, and (ii) ti is a sink (i.e. has no outgoing edges). in G. We
now describe the changes we apply to G in order to get the underlying graph structure of the weighted
arena and then comment on the weight function. Let all vertices from G be Adam vertices and s1 be
the initial vertex. We replace all edges on t1—edges of the form (v, t1) incident, for some v—by a copy
of the gadget shown in Figure 8. Next, we add self-loops on t1 and t2 with weights 1 and 2, respectively.
Finally, the weights of all remaining edges are 0.
We claim that, in this weighted arena, Eve can ensure regret strictly less than 1—for payoff functions
Sup and LimSup—if and only if in G the vertex pairs (s1, t1) and (s2, t2) cannot be joined by vertex-
disjoint paths. Indeed, we claim that the strategy that minimizes the regret of Eve is the strategy that,
in states where she has a choice, tells her to go to t1.
First, let us prove that this strategy has regret strictly less than 1 if and only if no two disjoint paths
in the graph exist between the pairs of states (s1, t1) and (s2, t2). Assume the latter is the case. Then if
Adam chooses to always avoid t1, then clearly the regret is 0. If t1 is eventually reached, then the choice
of Eve secures a value of 1 (for all payoff functions). Note that if she had chosen to go towards s2 instead,
as there are no two disjoint paths, we know that either the path constructed from s2 by Adam never
reaches t2, and then the value of the path is 0—and the regret is 0 for Eve—or the path constructed from
s2 reaches t1 again since Adam is playing positionally—and, again, the regret is 0 for Eve. Now assume
that two disjoint paths between the source-target pairs exist. If Eve changed her strategy to go towards
s2 (instead of choosing t1) then Adam has a strategy to reach t2 and achieve a payoff of 2. Thus, her
regret would be equal to 1.
Second, we claim that any other strategy of Eve has a regret greater than or equal to 1. Indeed, if
Eve decides to go towards s2 (instead of choosing to go to t1) then Adam can choose to loop on the state
before s2 and the payoff in this case is 0. Hence, the regret of Eve is at least 1.
Note that minimal changes are required for the same construction to imply the result for Inf. Further,
the weight function and threshold r can be accommodated so that Eve wins for the non-strict regret
threshold. Hence, the general result follows.
Memory requirements for Eve. It follows from our algorithms for computing regret in this variant
that Eve only requires strategies with exponential memory. Examples where exponential memory is
necessary can be easily constructed.
Corollary 2. For all payoff functions Sup, Inf, LimSup, LimInf, MP and MP, for all game graphs G,
there exists m which is 2O(|G|) such that:
Reg
S∃,Σ1∀
(G) = RegΣm
∃
,Σ1
∀
(G).
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5 Variant III: Adam plays word strategies
For this variant, we provide tight upper and lower bounds for all the payoff functions: the regret threshold
problem is EXPTIME-complete for Sup, Inf, LimSup, and LimInf, and undecidable for MP and MP. For
the later case, the decidability can be recovered when we fix a priori the size of the memory that Eve
can use to play, the decision problem is then NP-complete. Finally, we show that our notion of regret
minimization for word strategies generalizes the notion of good for games introduced by Henzinger and
Piterman in [HP06], and we also formalize the relation that exists with the notion of determinization by
pruning for weighted automata introduced by Aminof et al. in [AKL10].
Additional definitions. We say that a strategy of Adam is a word strategy if his strategy can be
expressed as a function τ : N → [max{deg+(v) | v ∈ V }], where [n] = {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and deg+(v) is the
outdegree of v (i.e. the number of edges leaving v). Intuitively, we consider an order on the successors
of each Adam vertex. On every turn, the strategy τ of Adam will tell him to move to the i-th successor
(or to a sink state, if its outdegree is less than i) of the vertex according to the fixed order. We denote
by W∀ the set of all such strategies for Adam. When considering word strategies, it is more natural to
see the arena as a (weighted) automaton.
A weighted automaton is a tuple Γ = (Q, qI , A,∆, w) where A is a finite alphabet, Q is a finite set
of states, qI is the initial state, ∆ ⊆ Q × A × Q is the transition relation, w : ∆ → Z assigns weights
to transitions. A run of Γ on a word a0a1 . . . ∈ A
ω is a sequence ρ = q0a0q1a1 . . . ∈ (Q × A)
ω such
that (qi, ai, qi+1) ∈ ∆, for all i ≥ 0, and has value Val(ρ) determined by the sequence of weights of the
transitions of the run and the payoff function. The value Γ assigns to a word is the supremum of the
values of all its runs on the word. We say the automaton is deterministic if ∆ is functional.
A game in which Adam plays word strategies can be reformulated as a game played on a weighted
automaton Γ = (Q, qI , A,∆, w) and strategies of Adam – of the form τ : N→ A – determine a sequence
of input symbols to which Eve has to react by choosing ∆-successor states starting from qI . In this
setting a strategy of Eve which minimizes regret defines a run by resolving the non-determinism of ∆ in
Γ, and ensures the difference of value given by the constructed run is minimal w.r.t. the value of the best
run on the word spelled out by Adam. For instance, if all vertices in Fig. 1 are replaced by states, Eve
can choose the successor of v1 regardless of what letter Adam plays and from v2 and v3 Adam chooses
the successor by choosing to play a or b. Furthermore, his choice of letter tells Eve what would have
happened had the play been at the other state.
The following result summarizes the results of this section:
Theorem 3. Deciding if the regret value is less than a given threshold (strictly or non-strictly) playing
against word strategies of Adam is EXPTIME-complete for Inf, Sup, LimInf, and LimSup; it is undecidable
for MP and MP.
Upper bounds. There is an EXPTIME algorithm for solving the regret threshold problem for Inf, Sup,
LimInf, and LimSup. This algorithm is obtained by a reduction to parity and Streett games.
Lemma 12. For r ∈ Q, weighted automaton Γ and payoff function Inf, Sup, LimInf, or LimSup, deter-
mining whether RegS∃,W∀(Γ)⊳ r, for ⊳ ∈ {<,≤}, can be done in exponential time.
We show how to decide the strict regret threshold problem. However, the same algorithm can be
adapted for the non-strict version by changing strictness of the inequalities used to define the par-
ity/Streett accepting conditions.
Proof. We focus on the LimInf and LimSup payoff functions. The result for Inf and Sup follows from the
translation to LimInf and LimSup games given in Sect. 3. Our decision algorithm consists in first building
a deterministic automaton for Γ = (Q1, qI , A,∆1, w1) using the construction provided in [CDH10]. We
denote by DΓ = (Q2, sI , A,∆2, w2) this deterministic automaton and we know that it is at most expo-
nentially larger than Γ. Next, we consider a simulation game played by Eve and Adam on the automata
Γ and DΓ. The game is played for an infinite number of rounds and builds runs in the two automata,
it starts with the two automata in their respective initial states (qI , sI), and if the current states are q1
and q2, then the next round is played as follows:
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• Adam chooses a letter a ∈ A, and the state of the deterministic automaton is updated accordingly,
i.e. q′2 = ∆2(q2, a), then
• Eve updates the state of the non-deterministic automaton to q′1 by reading a using one of the edges
labelled with a in the current state, i.e. she chooses q′1 such that q
′
1 ∈ ∆1(q1, a). The new state of
the game is (q′1, q
′
2).
Eve wins the simulation game if the minimal weight seen infinitely often in the run of the non-deterministic
automaton is larger than or equal to the minimal weight seen infinitely often in the deterministic au-
tomaton minus r. It should be clear that this happens exactly when Eve has a regret bounded by r in
the original regret game on the word which is spelled out by Adam.
Let us focus on the lim inf payoff function now. We will sketch how this game can be translated into
a parity game. For completeness, we now provide a formal definition of the latter. A parity game is a
pair (G,Ω) where G is a non-weighted arena and Ω : V → N is a function that assigns a priority to each
vertex. Plays, strategies, and other notions are defined as with games played on weighted arenas. A play
in a parity game induces an infinite sequence of priorities. We say a play is winning for Eve if and only
if the minimal priority seen infinitely often is odd. The parity index of a parity game is the number of
priorities labelling its vertices, that is |{Ω(v) | v ∈ V }|.
To obtain the translation, we keep the structure of the game as above but we assign priorities to the
edges of the games instead of weights. We do it in the following way. If X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} is the
ordered set of weight values that appear in the automata (note that |X | is bounded by the number of
edges in the non-deterministic automaton), then we need the set of priorities D = {2, . . . , 2n+ 1}. We
assign priorities to edges in the game as follows:
• when Adam chooses a letter a from q2, then if the weight that labels the edge that leaves q2 with
letter a in the deterministic automaton is equal to xi ∈ X , then the priority is set to 2i+ 1,
• when Eve updates the non-deterministic automaton from q1 with a edge labelled with weight w,
then the color is set to 2i where i is the index in X such that xi−1 ≤ w + r < xi.
It should be clear then along a run, the minimal color seen infinitely often is odd if and only if the
corresponding run is winning for Eve in the simulation game. So, now it remains to solve a parity game
with exponentially many states and polynomially many priorities w.r.t. the size of Γ. This can be done
in exponential time with classical algorithms for parity games.
LimSup to Streett games. Let us now focus on LimSup. In this case we will reduce our problem to
that of determining the winner of a Streett game with state-space exponential w.r.t. the original game
but with number of Streett pairs polynomial (w.r.t. the original game). Recall that a Streett game is a
pair (G,F) where G is a game graph (with no weight function) and F ⊆ P(V )×P(V ) is a set of Streett
pairs. We say a play is winning for Eve if and only if for all pairs (E,F ) ∈ F , if a vertex in E is visited
infinitely often then some vertex in F is visited infinitely often as well.
Consider a LimSup automaton Γ = (Q, qI , A,∆, w). For xi ∈ {w(d) | d ∈ ∆} let us denote by A
≥xi
the Büchi automaton with Büchi transition set equivalent to all transitions with weight of at least xi.
We denote by D≥xi = (Qi, qi,I , A, δi,Ωi) the deterministic parity automaton with the same language as
A≥xi .3 From [Pit07] we have that D≥xi has at most 2|Q||Q||Q|! states and parity index 2|Q| (the number
of priorities). Now, let x1 < x2 < · · · < xl be the weights appearing in transitions of Γ. We construct
the (non-weighted) arena GΓ = (V, V∃, E, vI) and Streett pair set F as follows
• V = Q×
∏l
i=1Qi ∪Q×
∏l
i=1Qi ×A ∪Q×
∏l
i=1Qi ×A×Q;
• V∃ = Q×
∏l
i=1Qi ×A;
• vI = (qI , q1,I , . . . , ql,I);
• E contains
–
(
(p, p1, . . . , pl)), (p, p1, . . . , pl, a)
)
for all a ∈ A,
–
(
(p, pl, . . . , pl, a), (p, p1, . . . , pl, a, q)
)
if (p, a, q) ∈ ∆,
3Since δi is deterministic, we sometimes write δi(p, a) to denote the unique q ∈ Qi such that (p, a, q) ∈ δi.
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⊥0 ⊥2
A, 0 A, 2
A, 0bail, 0 A, 0 bail, 0
A \ {bail}, 0 A \ {bail}, 0
Figure 9: Initial gadget used in reduction from countdown games.
–
(
(p, pl, . . . , pl, a, q), (q, q1, . . . , ql)
)
if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l: (pi, a, qi) ∈ δi;
• For all 1 ≤ i ≤ l and all even y such that Range(Ωi) ∋ y, F contains the pair (Ei, Fi) where
– Ei,y = {(p, . . . , pi, . . . , pl, a, q) |Ωi(pi, a, δ(pi, a)) = y}, and
– Fi,y = {(p, . . . , pj, . . . , pl, a, q) | (Ωi(pi, a, δ(pi, a)) < y ∧ y (mod 2) = 1) ∨ w(p, a, q) ≥ xi − r}.
It is not hard to show that in the resulting Streett game, a strategy σ of Eve is winning against any
strategy τ of Adam if and only if for every automaton D≥xi which accepts the word induced by τ then
the run of Γ induced by σ has payoff of at least xi − r, if and only if Eve has a winning strategy in Γ to
ensure regret is less than r.
Note that the number of Streett pairs in GΓ is polynomial w.r.t. the size of Γ, i.e.
|F| ≤
l∑
i=0
|Range(Ωi)|
≤ l · 2|Q|
≤ |Q|2 · 2|Q| = 2|Q|3.
From [PP06] we have that Streett games can be solved in time O(mnk+1kk!) where n is the number of
states, m the number of transitions and k the number of pairs in F . Thus, in this case we have that GΓ
can be solved in
O
(
(2|Q||Q||Q|!)3+2|Q|
3
· 2|Q|3 · (2|Q|3)!
)
.
which is still exponential time w.r.t. the size of Γ.
Lower bounds. We first establish EXPTIME-hardness for the payoff functions Inf, Sup, LimInf, and
LimSup by giving a reduction from countdown games [JSL08]. That is, we show that given a countdown
game, we can construct a game where Eve ensures regret less than 2 if and only if Counter wins in the
original countdown game.
Lemma 13. For r ∈ Q, weighted automaton Γ and payoff function Inf, Sup, LimInf, or LimSup, deter-
mining whether Reg
S∃,W∀
(Γ)⊳ r, for ⊳ ∈ {<,≤}, is EXPTIME-hard.
Let us first formalize what a countdown game is. A countdown game C consists of a weighted graph
(S, T ), where S is the set of states and T ⊆ S × (N \ {0}) × S is the transition relation, and a target
value N ∈ N. If t = (s, d, s′) ∈ T then we say that the duration of the transition t is d. A configuration
of a countdown game is a pair (s, c), where s ∈ S is a state and c ∈ N. A move of a countdown game
from a configuration (s, c) consists in player Counter choosing a duration d such that (s, d, s′) ∈ T for
some s′ ∈ S followed by player Spoiler choosing s′′ such that (s, d, s′′) ∈ T , the new configuration is then
(s′′, c+ d). Counter wins if the game reaches a configuration of the form (s,N) and Spoiler wins if the
game reaches a configuration (s, c) such that c < N and for all t = (s, d, ·) ∈ T we have that c+ d > N .
Deciding the winner in a countdown game C from a configuration (s, 0) – where N and all durations
in C are given in binary – is EXPTIME-complete.
of Lemma 13. Let us fix a countdown game C = ((S, T ), N) and let n = ⌊log2N⌋+ 2.
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. . .
xi
xi⊥2
. . .
xn
xn ⊥2
ci+1, 0
bi, 0
ci, 0
A \ {ci+1}, 0
ci+1, 0
ci+1, 0
bi, 0
ci, 0
bn, 0
cn, 0
A, 0
A, 2 A, 2
Figure 10: Counter gadget.
b0, 0
b0, 0
c1, 0
c1, 0
c2, 0
c2, 0
c3, 0
c3, 0 b4, 0
b4, 0
c5, 0
c5, 0
Figure 11: Adder gadget: depicted +9.
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Simplifying assumptions. Clearly, if Spoiler has a winning strategy and the game continues beyond
his winning the game, then eventually a configuration (s, c), such that c ≥ 2n, is reached. Thus, we
can assume w.l.o.g. that plays in C which visit a configuration (s,N) are winning for Counter and plays
which don’t visit a configuration (s,N) but eventually get to a configuration (s′, c) such that c ≥ 2n are
winning for Spoiler.
Additionally, we can also assume that T in C is total. That is to say, for all s ∈ S there is some
duration d such that (s, d, s′) ∈ T for some s′ ∈ S. If this were not the case then for every s with no
outgoing transitions we could add a transition (s,N + 1, s⊥) where s⊥ is a newly added state. It is easy
to see that either player has a winning strategy in this new game if and only if he has a winning strategy
in the original game.
Reduction. We will now construct a weighted arena Γ with W = 2 such that, in a regret game with
payoff function Sup played on Γ, Eve can ensure regret value strictly less than 2 if and only if Counter
has a winning strategy in C.
As all weights are 0 in the arena we build, with the exception of self-loops on sinks, the result holds
for Sup, LimSup and Inf. We describe the changes required for the inf result at the end.
Implementation. The alphabet of the weighted arena Γ = (Q, qI , A,∆, w) is A = {bi | 0 ≤ i ≤
n} ∪ {ci | 0 < i ≤ n} ∪ {bail, choose} ∪ S. We now describe the structure of Γ (i.e. Q, ∆ and w).
Initial gadget. Figure 9 depicts the initial state of the arena. Here, Eve has the choice of playing
left or right. If she plays to the left then Adam can play bail and force her to ⊥0 while the alternative
play resulting from her having chosen to go right goes to ⊥2. Hence, playing left already gives Adam a
winning strategy to ensure regret 2, so she plays to the right. If Adam now plays bail then Eve can go
to ⊥2 and as W = 2 this implies the regret will be 0. Therefore, Adam plays anything but bail.
Counter gadget. Figure 10 shows the left sub-arena. All states from {xi |0 ≤ i ≤ n} have incoming
transitions from the left part of the initial gadget with symbol A \ {bail} and weight 0. Let y0 . . . yn ∈ B
be the (little-endian) binary representation of N , then for all xi such that yi = 1 there is a transition
from xi to ⊥0 with weight 0 and symbol bail. Similarly, for all xi such that yi = 0 there is a transition
from xi to ⊥0 with weight 0 and symbol bail. All the remaining transitions not shown in the figure cycle
on the same state, e.g. xi goes to xi with symbol choose and weight 0.
The sub-arena we have just described corresponds to a counter gadget (little-endian encoding) which
keeps track of the sum of the durations “spelled” by Adam. At any point in time, the states of this sub-
arena in which Eve believes alternative plays are now will represent the binary encoding of the current
sum of durations. Indeed, the initial gadget makes sure Eve plays into the right sub-arena and therefore
she knows there are alternative play prefixes that could be at any of the xi states. This corresponds to
the 0 value of the initial configuration.
Adder gadget. Let us now focus on the right sub-arena in which Eve finds herself at the moment.
The right transition with symbol A\ {bail} from the initial gadget goes to state s – the initial state from
C. It is easy to see how we can simulate Counter’s choice of duration and Spoiler’s choice of successor.
From s there are transitions to every (s, c), such that (s, c, s′) ∈ T for some s′ ∈ S in C, with symbol
choose and weight 0. Transitions with all other symbols and weight 0 going to ⊥1 – a sink with a
1-weight cycle with every symbol – from s ensure Adam plays choose, lest since W = 2 the regret of the
game will be at most 1 and Eve wins.
Figure 11 shows how Eve forces Adam to “spell” the duration c of a transition of C from (s, c). For
concreteness, assume that Eve has chosen duration 9. The top source in Figure 11 is therefore the state
(s, 9). Again, transitions with all the symbols not depicted go to ⊥1 with weight 0 are added for all states
except for the bottom sink. Hence, Adam will play b0 and Eve has the choice of going straight down or
moving to a state where Adam is forced to play c1. Recall from the description of the counter gadget
that the belief of Eve encodes the binary representation of the current sum of delays. If she believes a
play is in x1 (and therefore none in x1) then after Adam plays b0 it is important for her to make him
play c1 or this alternative play will end up in ⊥2. It will be clear from the construction that Adam
always has a strategy to keep the play in the right sub-arena without reaching ⊥1 and therefore if any
alternative play from the left sub-arena is able to reach ⊥2 then Adam wins (i.e. can ensure regret 2).
Thus, Eve decides to force Adam to play c1. As the duration was 9 this gadget now forces Adam to play
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b4 and again presents the choice of forcing Adam to play c5 to Eve. Clearly this can be generalized for
any duration. This gadget in fact simulates a cascade configuration of n 1-bit adders.
Finally, from the bottom sink in the adder gadget, we have transitions with symbols from S with
weight 0 to the corresponding states (thus simulating Spoiler’s choice of successor state). Additionally,
with any symbol from S and with weight 0 Eve can also choose to go to a state qbail where Adam is
forced to play bail and Eve is forced into ⊥0.
Argument. Note that if the simulation of the counter has been faithful and the belief of Eve encodes
the value N then by playing bail, Adam forces all of the alternative plays in the left sub-arena into the
⊥0 sink. Hence, if Counter has a winning strategy and Eve faithfully simulates the C she can force this
outcome of all plays going to ⊥0. Note that from the right sub-arena we have that ⊥2 is not reachable
and therefore the highest payoff achievable was 1. Therefore, her regret is of at most 1.
Conversely, if both players faithfully simulate C and the configuration N is never reached, i.e. Spoiler
had a winning strategy in C then eventually some alternative play in the left sub-arena will reach xn and
from there it will go to ⊥2. Again, the construction makes sure that Adam always has a strategy to keep
the play in the right sub-arena from reaching ⊥1 and therefore this outcome yields a regret of 2 for Eve.
Changes for Inf. For the same reduction to work for the Inf payoff function we add an additional
symbol kick to the alphabet of Γ. We also add deterministic transitions with kick, from all states which
are not sinks ⊥x for some x, to ⊥0. Finally, all non-loop transitions in the initial gadget are now given a
weight of 2; the ones in the counter gadget are given a weight of 2 as well; the ones in the adder gadget
(i.e. right sub-arena) are given a weight of 1.
We observe that if Counter has a winning strategy in the original game C then Eve still has a winning
strategy in Γ. The additional symbol kick allows Adam to force Eve into a 0-loop but also ensures that
all alternative plays also go to ⊥0, thus playing kick is not beneficial to Adam unless an alternative play
is already at ⊥2. Conversely, if Spoiler has a winning strategy in C then Adam has a strategy to allow
an alternative play to reach ⊥2 while Eve remains in the adder gadget. He can then play kick to ensure
the payoff of Eve is 0 and achieve a maximal regret of 2.
Once again, we observe that the above reduction can be readily parameterized. That is, we can
replace the 2 value, the 1 value and the 0 value from the ⊥2,⊥1,⊥0 sink loops by arbitrary values A, B,
C satisfying the following constraints:
• A > B > C,
• A− C ≥ r so that Eve loses by going left in the initial gadget,
• A−B < r so that she does not lose by faithfully simulating the adder if she has a winning strategy
from the countdown game, or in other words: if Adam cheats then A−B is low enough to punish
him,
• B−C < r so that she does not regret having faithfully simulated addition, that is, if she plays her
winning strategy from the countdown game then she does not consider B −C too high and regret
it.
Changing the strictness of the last three constraints and finding a suitable valuation for r and A,B,C
suffices for the reduction to work for the non-strict regret threshold problem. Such a valuation is given
by A = 2, B = 1, C = 0 with r = 1.
To show undecidability of the problem for the mean-payoff function we give a reduction from the
threshold problem in mean-payoff games with partial-observation. This problem was shown to be unde-
cidable in [DDG+10,HPR14].
Lemma 14. For r ∈ Q, weighted automaton Γ and payoff function MP or MP, determining whether
RegS∃,W∀(Γ) ⊳ r, for ⊳ ∈ {<,≤}, is undecidable even if Eve is only allowed to play finite memory
strategies.
A mean-payoff game with partial-observation (MPGPO for short) G is a tuple (Q, qI , A,∆, w,Obs)
whereQ is a set of states, qI is the initial state of the game, A is a finite set of actions, ∆ ⊆ Q×A×Q is the
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transition relation, w : ∆→ Q is a weight function and Obs ⊆ P(Q) is a partition of Q into observations.
In these games a play is started by placing a token on qI , Eve then chooses an action from A and Adam
resolves non-determinism by choosing a valid successor (w.r.t. ∆). Additionally, Eve does not know
which state Adam has chosen as the successor, she is only revealed the observation containing the state.
More formally: a concrete play in such a game is a sequence q0a0q1a1 . . . ∈ (Q×A)
ω such that q0 = qI
and (qi, ai, qi+1) ∈ ∆, for all i ≥ 0. An abstract play is then a sequence ψ = o0a0o1a1 . . . ∈ (Obs × A)
ω
such that there is some concrete play pi = q0a0q1a1 . . . and qi ∈ oi, for all i ≥ 0; in this case we say that
pi is a concretization of ψ. Strategies of Eve in this game are of the form σ : (Obs ×A)∗Obs → A, that
is to say they are observation-based. Strategies of Adam are not symmetrical, he is allowed to use the
exact state information, i.e. his strategies are of the form τ : (Q×A)∗ → Q.
The threshold problem for mean-payoff games is defined as follows. Given ν ∈ Q, determining whether
Eve has an observation-based strategy such that, for all counter-strategies of Adam, the resulting abstract
play has no concretization with mean-payoff value (strictly) less than ν. For convenience, let us denote
this problem by maxMPGPO(> ν) and by maxMPGPO(≥ ν) when the inequality is strict and non-
strict, respectively. Note that in this case Eve is playing to maximize the mean-payoff value of all concrete
runs corresponding to the abstract play being played while Adam is minimizing the same.
It was shown in [DDG+10,HPR14] that both problems are undecidable for MP and for MP. That
is, determining if maxMPGPO(> ν) or maxMPGPO(≥ ν) is undecidable regardless of the definition
used for the mean-payoff function. Further, if we ask for the existence of finite memory observation-based
strategies of Eve only, both definitions (MP and MP) coincide and the problem remains undecidable.
Consider a given MPGPO H = (Q, qI , A,∆, w,Obs), and denote by H
′ the game obtained by multi-
plying by −1 all values assigned by w to the transitions of H . Clearly, we get that the answer to whether
maxMPGPO(> ν) (resp. maxMPGPO(≥ ν)) in H is affirmative if and only if in H ′ Eve has an
observation-based strategy to ensure that against any strategy of Adam, the resulting abstract play is
such that all concretizations have mean-payoff value of less than or equal to −ν (resp. strictly less than
−ν). Denote these problems by minMPGPO(< µ) and minMPGPO(≤ µ), respectively. It follows
that for any definition of the mean-payoff function, these problems are undecidable (even if we are only
interested in finite memory strategies of Eve).
Simplifying assumptions. We assume, w.l.o.g., that in mean-payoff games with partial-observation
the transition relation is total. As the weights in mean-payoff games with partial-observation can be
shifted and scaled, we can assume w.l.o.g. that ν is any integer N . Furthermore, we can also assume
that the mean-payoff value of any concrete play in a game is bounded from below by 0 and from above
by M (this can again be achieved by shifting and scaling).
of Lemma 14. We give a reduction from the threshold problem of mean-payoff games with partial obser-
vation [DDG+10,HPR14] that resembles the reduction used for the proof of Lemma 13. More specifically,
given a mean-payoff game with partial-observation H = (S, sI , T, B, c, Obs), we construct a weighted au-
tomaton ΓH = (Q, qI ,∆, A, w) with the same payoff function such that
RegΣ∃,Σ1∀
(ΓH) < R
if and only if the answer to minMPGPO(< N) is affirmative. The reduction we describe works for any
R,N,M,C such that
• C < R,
• M2 − C < R, and
• N2 ≤ R,
for concreteness we consider R = 4, N = 4, M = 6 and C = 3.
Let us describe how to construct the weighted arena ΓH from G. The alphabet of ΓH is A =
B ∪ {bail} ∪ Obs. The structure of ΓH includes a gadget such as the one depicted in Figure 9. Recall
from the proof of Lemma 12 that this gadget ensures Eve chooses to go to the right sub-arena, lest Adam
has a spoiling strategy. As the left sub-arena we have a modified version of H . First, for every state
s ∈ S and every action b ∈ B, we add an intermediate state (s, b) such that when b is played from s the
play deterministically goes to (s, b) and for any transition (s, b, s′) in H we add a transition in ΓH from
23
(s, b) to s′ with action os′ , where os′ is the observation containing s
′. Second, we add transitions from
every s ∈ S to ⊥C for symbol bail with weight 0 and from every (s, b) to ⊥C with symbol o if there is
no s′ ∈ o such that (s, b, s′) ∈ T . The sink ⊥C has, for every symbol a ∈ A, a weight C self-loop. As the
right sub-arena we will have states qb for all b ∈ B. For any such qb there are transitions with weight
0 and symbol b to qobs and transitions with weight 0 and symbols A \ {b} to ⊥C . From qobs with any
symbol from Obs, there are 0-weight transitions to qb′ (for any b
′ ∈ B) and transitions with weight 0
and symbols A \Obs to ⊥C . All qb have incoming edges from the state of the initial gadget which leads
to the right sub-arena.
We claim that Eve has a strategy σ in ΓH to ensure regret less than R if and only if the answer to
minMPGPO(< N) is affirmative. Assume that the latter is the case, i.e. in H Eve has an observation-
based strategy to ensure that against any strategy of Adam the abstract play has no concretization with
mean-payoff value greater than or equal to N . Let us describe the strategy of Eve in ΓH . First, she plays
into the right sub-arena of the game. Once there, she tries to visit states qb0qb1 . . . based on her strategy
for H . If Adam, at some qbi does not play bi, or at some visit to qobs he plays a non-observation symbol,
then Eve goes to ⊥C . The play then has value C. Since no alternative play in the left sub-arena can
have value greater than M2 and we have that
M
2 −C < R, Eve wins. Thus, we can assume that Adam, at
every qbi plays the symbol bi and at every visit to qobs plays an observation. Note that, by construction
of the left sub-arena, we are forcing Adam to reveal a sequence of observations to Eve and allowing her
to choose a next action. It follows that the value of the play in ΓH is 0. Any alternative play in the right
sub-arena would have value of at most C as the highest weight in it is C. In the left sub-arena, we have
that all alternative plays have value less than N2 . Indeed, since she has followed her winning strategy
from H , and since by construction we have that all alternative plays in the left sub-arena correspond to
concretizations of the abstract path spelled by Adam and Eve, if there were some play with value of at
least N2 this would contradict her strategy being optimal. As C < R and
N
2 < R, we have that Eve wins
the regret game, i.e. her strategy ensures regret less than R.
Conversely, assume that the answer to minMPGPO(< N) is negative. Then regardless, of which
strategy from H Eve decides to follow, we know there will be some alternative play in the left sub-arena
with value of at least N2 . If Adam allows Eve to play any such strategy then the value of the play is 0
and her regret is at least N2 ≤ R, which concludes the proof for the strict regret threshold problem.
We observe that the restriction on N,M,R and C can easily be adapted to allow for a reduction from
minMPGPO(≤ N) to the non-strict regret threshold problem.
Finally, we note that in the above proof Eve might require infinite memory as it is known that in
mean-payoff games with partial-observation the protagonist might require infinite memory to win. Yet,
as we have already mentioned, even if we ask whether Eve has a winning finite memory observation-based
strategy, the problem remains undecidable. Notice that the above construction – when restricting Eve
to play with finite memory – gives us a reduction from this exact problem. Hence, even when restricting
Eve to use only finite memory, the problem is undecidable.
Memory requirements for Eve and Adam. It is known that positional strategies suffice for Eve
in parity games. On the other hand, for Streett games she might require exponential memory (see,
e.g. [DJW97]). This exponential blow-up, however, is only on the number of pairs—which we have
already argued remains polynomial w.r.t. the original automaton. It follows that:
Corollary 3. For payoff functions Sup, Inf, LimSup, LimInf, for all weighted automata A, there exists
m which is 2O(|A|) such that:
Reg
S∃,W∀
(A) = RegΣm
∃
,W∀
(A).
Fixed memory for Eve. Since the problem is EXPTIME-hard for most payoff functions and already
undecidable for MP and MP, we now fix the memory Eve can use.
Theorem 4. For r ∈ Q, weighted automaton Γ and payoff function Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, MP, or
MP, determining whether RegΣm
∃
,W∀
(Γ)⊳ r, for ⊳ ∈ {<,≤}, can be done in NTIME(m2|Γ|2).
Denote by R∀ ⊆W∀ the set of all word strategies of Adam which are regular. That is to say, w ∈ R∀
if and only if w is ultimately periodic. It is well-known that the mean-payoff value of ultimately periodic
plays in weighted arenas is the same for both MP and MP.
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Before proving the theorem we first show that ultimately periodic words suffice for Adam to spoil a
finite memory strategy of Eve. Let us fix some useful notation. Given weighted automaton Γ and a finite
memory strategy σ for Eve in Γ we denote by Γσ the deterministic automaton embodied by a refinement
of Γ that is induced by σ.
Lemma 15. For r ∈ Q, weighted automaton Γ, and payoff function Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, MP, or
MP, if RegΣm
∃
,W∀
(Γ)⊲ r then RegΣm
∃
,R∀
(Γ)⊲ r, for ⊲ ∈ {>,≥}.
Proof. For Inf, Sup, LimInf, and LimSup the result follows from Lemma 12. It is known that positional
strategies suffice for either player to win a parity game. Thus, if Adam wins the parity game defined
in the proof of Lemma 12 then he has a positional strategy to do so. Now, for any strategy of Eve in
the original game, one can translate the winning strategy of Adam in the parity game into a spoiling
strategy of Adam in the regret game. This strategy will have finite memory and will thus correspond to
an ultimately periodic word. Hence, it suffices for us to show the claim follows for mean-payoff. We do
so for MP and ≥ but the result for MP follows from minimal changes to the argument (a small quantifier
swap in fact) and for > variations we need only use the strict versions of Equations (∗) and (11). We
assume without loss of generality that all weights are non-negative.
Let σ be the best (regret minimizing) strategy of Eve in Γ which uses at most memory m. We claim
that if Adam has a word strategy to ensure the regret of Eve in Γ is at least r then he also has a regular
word strategy to do so.
Consider the bi-weighted graph G constructed by taking the synchronous product of Γ and Γσ while
labelling every edge with two weights: the value assigned to the transition by the weight function of Γσ
and the value assigned to the transition by that of Γ. For a path pi in G, denote by wi(pi) the sum of the
weights of the edges traversed by pi w.r.t. the i-th weight function. Also, for an infinite path pi, denote
by MPi the mean-payoff value of pi w.r.t. the i-th weight function. Clearly, Adam has a word strategy
to ensure a regret of at least r against the strategy σ of Eve if and only if there is an infinite path pi
in G such that MP2(pi) − MP1(pi) ≥ r. We claim that if this is the case then there is a simple cycle χ
in G such that 1|χ|w2(χ) −
1
|χ|w1(χ) ≥ r. The argument is based on the cycle decomposition of pi (see,
e.g. [EM79]).
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that all the cycles χ in G satisfy the following:
1
|χ|
w2(χ)−
1
|χ|
w1(χ) ≤ r − ε, for some 0 < ε ≤ r, (∗)
and let us consider an arbitrary infinite path pi = v0v1 . . . . Let l = MP1(pi). We will show
lim inf
k→∞
w2(〈vj〉j≤k)
k
− l ≤ r − ε, (11)
from which the required contradiction follows.
For any k ≥ 0, the cycle decomposition of 〈vj〉j≤k tells us that apart from a small sub-path, pi
′, of
length at most n (the number of states in G), the prefix 〈vj〉j≤k can be decomposed into simple cycles
χ1, . . . , χt such that wi(〈vj〉j≤k) = wi(pi
′) +
∑t
j=1 wi(χj) for i = 1, 2. If W is the maximum weight
occurring in G, then from Equation (∗) we have:
w2(〈vj〉j≤k) ≤ nW +
t∑
j=1
w2(χj)
≤ nW + (r − ε)
t∑
j=1
|χj |+
t∑
j=1
w1(χj)
≤ nW + k(r − ε) + w1(〈vj〉j≤k).
Now, it follows from the definition of the limit inferior that for any ε′ > 0 and any K > 0 there
exists k > K such that w1(〈vj〉j≤k) ≤ k(l + ε
′). Thus for any ε′ > 0 and K ′ > 0, there exists
k > max{K ′, nW/ε′} such that
w2(〈vj〉j≤k)
k
≤
nW
k
+ (r − ε) + (l + ε′) < (l + r − ε) + 2ε′.
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Equation (11) then follows from the definition of limit inferior.
The above implies that Adam can, by repeating χ infinitely often, achieve a regret value of at least
r against strategy σ of Eve. As this can be done by him playing a regular word, the result follows.
We now proceed with the proof of the theorem. The argument is presented for mean-payoff (MP)
but minimal changes are required for the other payoff functions. For simplicity, we use the non-strict
threshold for the emptiness problems. However, the result from [CDH10] is independent of this. Further,
the exact same argument presented here works for both cases. Thus, if suffices to show the result follows
for ≥.
of Theorem 4. We will “guess” a strategy for Eve which uses memory at mostm and verify (in polynomial
time w.r.t. m and the size of Γ) that it ensures a regret value of strictly less than r.
Let A be the mean-payoff (MP) automaton constructed as the synchronous product of Γ and Γσ.
The new weight function maps a transition to the difference of the values of the weight functions of the
two original automata. We claim that the language of A is empty (for accepting threshold ≥ r) if and
only if regσΣm
∃
,W∀
(Γ) < r. Indeed, there is a bijective map from every run of A to a pair of plays pi, pi′
in Γ such that both pi and pi′ are consistent with the same word strategy of Adam and pi is consistent
with σ. It will be clear that A has size at most m|Γ|. As emptiness of a weighted automaton A can be
decided in O(|A|2) time [CDH10], the result will follow.
We now show that if the language of A is not empty then Adam can ensure a regret value of at least
r against σ in Γ and that, conversely, if Adam has a spoiling strategy against σ in Γ then that implies
the language of A is not empty.
Let ρx be a run of A on x. From the definition of A we get that MP(ρx) = lim infi→∞
1
i
∑i
j=0(aj−bj)
where αx = 〈ai〉i≥0 and βx = 〈bi〉i≥0 are the infinite sequences of weights assigned to the transitions
of ρ by the weight functions of Γ and Γσ respectively. It is known that if a mean-payoff automaton
accepts a word y then it must accept an ultimately periodic word y′, thus we can assume that x is
ultimately periodic (see, e.g. [CDH10]). Furthermore, we can also assume the run of the automaton on
x is ultimately periodic. Recall that for ultimately periodic runs we have that MP(ρx) = MP(ρx). We
get the following
MP(ρx) = lim sup
i→∞
1
i
i∑
j=0
(aj − bj)
≤ lim sup
i→∞
1
i
i∑
j=0
aj + lim sup
i→∞
−1
i
i∑
j=0
bj sub-additivity of lim sup
≤ lim sup
i→∞
1
i
i∑
j=0
aj − lim inf
i→∞
1
i
i∑
j=0
bj
≤ lim inf
i→∞
1
i
i∑
j=0
aj − lim inf
i→∞
1
i
i∑
j=0
bj ultimate periodicity.
Thus, as x and ρx can be be mapped to a strategy of Adam in Γ which ensures regret of at least r against
σ, the claim follows.
For the other direction, assume Adam has a word strategy τ in Γ which ensures a regret of at least
r against σ. From Lemma 15 it follows that τ and the run ρ of Γ with value Γ(τ) can be assumed to
be ultimately periodic w.l.o.g.. Denote by ρσ and wσ the run of Γσ on τ and the weight function of Γσ
respectively. We then get that
lim inf
i→∞
1
i
wσ(ρσ)− lim inf
i→∞
1
i
w(ρ)
= lim inf
i→∞
1
i
wσ(ρσ) + lim sup
i→∞
−1
i
w(ρ)
= lim inf
i→∞
1
i
wσ(ρσ) + lim inf
i→∞
−1
i
w(ρ) ultimate periodicity
≤ MP(ψτ ) super-additivity of lim inf ,
26
. . .
. . .
⊥2
1 n
# #
1 n
A, 2
Figure 12: Clause choosing gadget for the SAT reduction. There are as many paths from top to bottom
(⊥2) as there are clauses (n).
where ψτ is the corresponding run of A for τ and ρ. Hence, A has at least one word in its language.
We provide a matching lower bound. The proof is an adaptation of the NP-hardness proof from [AKL10].
Theorem 5. For r ∈ Q, weighted automaton Γ and payoff function Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, MP, or
MP, determining whether RegΣ1
∃
,W∀
(Γ)⊳ r, for ⊳ ∈ {<,≤}, is NP-hard.
Proof. We give a reduction from the SAT problem, i.e. satisfiability of a CNF formula. The construction
presented is based on a proof in [AKL10]. The idea is simple: given boolean formula Φ in CNF we
construct a weighted automaton ΓΦ such that Eve can ensure regret value of at most 1 with a positional
strategy in ΓΦ if and only if Φ is satisfiable.
Let us now fix a boolean formula Φ in CNF with n clauses and m boolean variables x1, . . . , xm. The
weighted automaton ΓΦ = (Q, qI , A,∆, w) has alphabet A = {bail,#} ∪ {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. ΓΦ includes an
initial gadget such as the one depicted in Figure 9. Recall that this gadget forces Eve to play into the
right sub-arena. As the left sub-arena of ΓΦ we attach the gadget depicted in Figure 12. All transitions
shown have weight 1 and all missing transitions in order for ΓΦ to be complete lead to a state ⊥0 with a
self-loop on every symbol from A with weight 0. Intuitively, as Eve must go to the right sub-arena then
all alternative plays in the left sub-arena correspond to either Adam choosing a clause i and spelling
i#i to reach ⊥2 or reaching ⊥0 by playing any other sequence of symbols. The right sub-arena of the
automaton is as shown in Figure 13, where all transitions shown have weight 1 and all missing transitions
go to ⊥0 again. Here, from q0 we have transitions to state xj with symbol i if the i-th clause contains
variable xj . For every state xj we have transitions to jtrue and jfalse with symbol #. The idea is to
allow Eve to choose the truth value of xj . Finally, every state jtrue (or jfalse) has a transition to ⊥1
with symbol i if the literal xj (resp. ¬xj) appears in the i-th clause.
The argument to show that Eve can ensure regret of 0 if and only if Φ is satisfiable is straightforward.
Assume the formula is indeed satisfiable. Assume, also, that Adam chooses 1 ≤ i ≤ n and spells i#i.
Since Φ is satisfiable there is a choice of values for x1, . . . , xm such that for each clause there must be at
least one literal in the i-th clause which makes the clause true. Eve transitions, in the right sub-arena
from q0 to the corresponding value and when Adam plays # she chooses the correct truth value for the
27
q0
x1
1true 1false
x2
2true 2false
⊥1
1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3
# # # #
1
2, 3 1, 2
3
A, 1
Figure 13: Value choosing gadget for the SAT reduction. Depicted is the configuration for (x1 ∨ x2) ∧
(¬x1 ∨ x2) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ ¬x2).
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variable. Thus, the play reaches ⊥1 and, as W = 2 in Φ it follows that her regret is 0. If Adam does not
play i#i, for some i then all runs will have value at most 1 and the regret of Eve will thus be at most
1. Note that the strategy for Eve can be realized with a positional strategy by assigning to each xj the
choice of truth value and choosing from q0 any valid transition for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Conversely, if Φ is not satisfiable then for every valuation of variables x1, . . . , xm there is at least one
clause which is not true. Given any positional strategy of Eve in ΓΦ we can extract the corresponding
valuation of the boolean variables. Now Adam chooses 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that the i-th clause is not satisfied
by the assignment. The play will therefore end in ⊥0 while an alternative play in the left sub-arena will
reach ⊥1. Hence the regret of Eve in the game is 2.
To complete the proof we note that the above analysis is the same for payoff functions Inf, LimInf,
LimSup, and MP. For Sup it suffices to change all the weights on non-self-loops from 1 to 0.
We observe that, once more, that the same proof shows Eve can ensure regret of strictly less than 2
if and only if the formula is satisfiable. Hence, the result for the non-strict regret threshold problem as
well.
Relation to other works. Let us first extend the definitions of approximation, embodiment and refine-
ment from [AKL10] to the setting of ω-words. Consider two weighted automata A = (QA, qI , A,∆A, wA)
and B = (QB, qI , A,∆B, wB) and let d : R×R→ R be a metric.
4 We say B (strictly) α-approximates A
(with respect to d) if d(B(w),A(w)) ≤ α (resp. d(B(w),A(w)) < α) for all words w ∈ Aω. We say B em-
bodies A if QA ⊆ QB, ∆A ⊆ ∆B and wA agrees with wB on ∆A. For an automaton A = (Q, qI , A,∆, w)
and an integer k ≥ 0, the k-refinement of A is the automaton obtained by refining the state space of A
using k boolean variables. Intuitively, this corresponds to having 2k copies of every state, with each copy
of p transitioning to all copies of q with a if (p, a, q) ∈ ∆. The automaton A is said to be (strictly) (α, k)-
determinizable by pruning (DBP, for short) if the k-refinement of A embodies a deterministic automaton
which (strictly) α-approximates A. The next result follows directly from the above definitions.
Proposition 2. For α ∈ Q, k ∈ N, a weighted automaton Γ is (strictly) (α, k)-DBP (w.r.t. the difference
metric) if and only if Reg
Σ2
k
∃
,W∀
(Γ) ≤ α (resp. Reg
Σ2
k
∃
,W∀
(Γ) < α).
In [HP06] the authors define good for games automata. Their definition is based on a game which
is played on an ω-automaton by Spoiler and Simulator. We propose the following generalization of the
notion of good for games automata for weighted automata. A weighted automaton A is (strictly) α-good
for games if Simulator, against any word w ∈ Aω spelled by Spoiler, can resolve non-determinism in A
so that the resulting run has value v and d(v,A(w)) ≤ α (resp. d(v,A(w)) < α), for some metric d. We
summarize the relationship that follows from the definition in the following result:
Proposition 3. For α ∈ Q, a weighted automaton Γ is (strictly) α-good for games (w.r.t. the difference
metric) if and only if RegS∃,W∀(Γ) ≤ α (resp. RegS∃,W∀(Γ) < α).
6 Discussion
In this work we have considered the regret threshold problem in quantitative games. We have studied
three variants which corresponds to different assumptions regarding the behavior of Adam. Our definition
of regret is based on the difference measure: Eve attempts to minimize the difference between the value
she obtains by playing the game, and the value she could have obtained if she had known the strategy
of Adam in advance. In [AKL10] the ratio measure was used instead. We believe some of the results
obtained presently can be extended to arbitrary metrics (as in, e.g., [BH14]). In particular, all hardness
statements should hold. We give more precise claims for the ratio measure below.
For Inf, Sup, LimInf, and LimSup. We have already observed that upper bounds for the regret thresh-
old problem follow directly from our results if regret is defined using ratio (see Remark 1). Furthermore,
all hardness results presented here can also be adapted to obtain the same result for ratio. Indeed, the
same constructions and gadgets can be used. These, together with correctly chosen regret threshold value
r and modified edge weights and inequalities (such as the ones given to prove, for instance, Lemma 8)
are sufficient to show the same results hold for regret defined with ratio.
4The metric used in [AKL10] is the ratio measure.
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For MP. All hardness results also hold for regret defined with ratio. As with the other payoff functions,
minimal modifications are needed for the proofs given in this work to imply the result for the alternative
definition of regret. Regarding the algorithms, we have solved the regret threshold problem for the first
two variants. In the third variant, we have considered a restricted version of the game (Theorem 4)
and given an algorithm for it by reducing it to an the emptiness problem for mean-payoff automata.
We claim the corresponding problems are in the same complexity classes, respectively, when regret is
defined with ratio. For the first two, the proofs are almost identical to the ones we have give in the
present work for the difference measure. For the third problem, Lemma 15 must be restated for ratio,
yet the proof requires minimal modifications to work in that case. Finally, the argument used to prove
Theorem 4 requires the reduction to mean-payoff automata be replaced by a reduction to ratio automata.
However, all the properties from mean-payoff automata which were used in the proof, are also true for
ratio automata (e.g. ultimately periodic words being accepted if an arbitrary word is accepted). The
latter follow from results regarding ratio games in [BCG+14].
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